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with the order. The difference in Ibbotson was that in that case separate proceedings would
have to be brought for a breach of the statutory obligation before any criminal sanction could
be imposed. The same is true under section 1 of the 1998 Act. ^
Steel v United Kingdom 28 EHRR 603, Garyfallou AEBE v Greece 28 EHRR 344 and
Lauko v Slovakia 33 EHRR 994 merely illustrate the application in very different factual
situations of the three criteria in Engel v The Netherlands (No 1) 1 EHRR 647 without
adding any points of principle. ___
Applying the criminal standard of proof is wrong in three respects. First, it undermines one of
the purposes of section 1 of the 1998 Act, namely, to render it easier to obtain an anti-social
behaviour order than it would be to obtain a conviction for a comparable offence. Second, it
conflates the two elements in section 1 of the 1998 Act. There is no reason why the criminal
standard should be applied in relation to the question whether section I.(1 )(b) is satisfied:
that is a matter of evaluation as to future risk, and simply does not lend itself to being tested
by reference to the criminal standard of proof. Third, in relation to the issues generally under
section 1, the Court of
108,
Simon Cordell’s Skeleton Argument (2) Pdf
[2003] AC
61
R (McCann) v Manchester Crown Ct (HL(E)
Lord Steyn
Appeal’s approach subverts the proper classification of an anti- social behaviour order as
involving civil proceedings.
The civil standard of proof should be regarded as a single fixed standard. However, the more
serious the allegation the more cogent the evidence will need to be see in re H (Minors)
(Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563.
Solley QC in reply. Kostovski v Netherlands (1989) 12 EHRR. 434 and Saidi v France
(1993) 17 EHRR 251 involved a lack opportunity to examine witnesses.
The criminal standard of proof would not lie comfortably with the hearing of hearsay
evidence under the Civil Evidence Act 1995. There should be a declaration of incompatibility
under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Fulford QC in reply. Raimondo v Italy 18 EHRR 237 and Guzzardi v Italy 3 EHRR 333
involved very different proceedings from an anti-social behaviour order. See also Krone-
Verlog GmbH v Austria (Application No 28977/95) (unreported) 21 May 1997 and
Nottingham City Council v Zain (A Minor) [2002] 1 WLR 607.
Their Lordships took time for consideration.
17 October. LORD STEYN
My Lords, section 1. of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (“the Act”) provides for the making
of anti-social behaviour orders against any person aged ten years or over. It came into force
on 1 April 1999. Between 1 April 1999 and 31. December 2001. magistrates in England and
Wales made 588 such orders and refused 19. It is important social legislation designed to
remedy a problem which the existing law failed to deal with satisfactorily. This is the first
occasion on which the House has had to examine the implications of section 1.
There are two appeals before the House. They are unrelated but raise overlapping issues.
Both cases involve the power of the magistrates’ court under section 1 of the Act, upon being
satisfied of statutory requirements, to make an anti-social behaviour order prohibiting a
defendant from doing prescribed things. Breach of such an order may give rise to criminal
liability. That stage has, however, not been reached in either case. In the case of Clingbam no
order has been made. In the case of the McCann breathers antisocial behaviour orders have
been made against all three. The appeals are therefore concerned only with the first stage of

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