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evidence, direct or hearsay it may turn out that the defendant has no answer to the case under
section 1 (1). For the sake of completeness, I need only add that the use of the Civil Evidence
Act 1:995 unless in cases under the first part of section 1 are not in any way incompatible
with the Human Rights Act 1998.
The standard of proof
• Having concluded that the relevant proceedings arc civil, in principle it follows that the
standard of proof ordinarily applicable in civil £ proceedings, namely the balance of
probabilities, should apply. However,
I agree that, given the seriousness of matters involved, at least some reference to the
heightened civil standard would usually be necessary: In re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse:
Standard of Proof) [ 1996] AC 563, 586D-H, per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. For
essentially practical reasons, the Recorder of Manchester decided to apply the criminal
standard. The Court of Appeal said that would usually be the right course to adopt. Lord
Bingham of Cornhill has observed that the heightened civil standard and the criminal
standard are virtually indistinguishable. I do not disagree with any of these views. But in my
view pragmatism dictates that the task of magistrates should be made more straightforward
by ruling that they must in all cases under section 1 apply the criminal standard. If the House
takes this view it will be sufficient for the magistrates, when applying section T (I){a) to be
sure c that the defendant has acted in an anti-social manner, that is to say, in a manner that
caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the
same household as himself. The inquiry under section I(I)(b), namely that such an order is
necessary to protect Persians from further anti-social acts by him, does not involve a standard
of proof: it is an exercise of judgment or evaluation. Ibis approach should facilitate correct
decision-making and should ensure consistency and predictability in this corner of the law. In
coming to this conclusion, I bear in mind that the use of hearsay evidence will often be of
crucial importance.
For my part, hearsay evidence depending on its logical proactiveness is quite capable of
satisfying the requirements of section 1.
122,
Simon Cordell’s Skeleton Argument (2) Pdf
[2003] AC
74
R (McCann) v Manchester Crown Ct (HL(E)
Lord Steyn
A XII The submissions of Liberty
The House gave permission to Liberty to intervene in the McCann case in writing and orally.
The contribution of Liberty has helped to sharpen the focus of the debate on issues under the
Human Rights Act 1998. It is, however, unnecessary to deal separately with the submissions
of Liberty. The reasons I have given are also dispositive of the issues and arguments
g raised by Liberty.
• Jurisdiction
Section x(x)(a) of the Administration of Justice Act i960 only permits an appeal from a
decision of the High Court “in any criminal cause or matter”. In my view the proceedings
under the first part of section 1 do not satisfy this criterion. It follows that in the Clingman
case the House did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
• Disposal
For these reasons as well as the reasons given by Lord Hope of Craighead I would dismiss
the appeals in the McCann case and formally declare that there was no jurisdiction to hear
the Clingham case.
LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD

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