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-       I further consider that a complaint brought against a defendant under section 1(3} of
               the 1998 Act does not constitute an allegation of a crime. The fact that the background to the
               complaint will very often be the alleged commission of a number of criminal offences does
               not mean that the complaint constitutes a charge of a criminal offence: see S v Miller 2001
               SC 977, 989-990, para 23 cited subsequently in paragraph 1.02 of this opinion.
               -       There are two further considerations which support the conclusion C that an
               application for an anti-social behaviour order is a civil proceeding and not a criminal
               proceeding. First, section 1 is contained in Part I of the Act under the heading “Prevention of
               crime and disorder” whereas Part II under the heading “Criminal law” creates a number of
               offences and provides for their punishment. Secondly, section 1(3) provides that an
               application for an anti-social behaviour order shall be made by complaint to a magistrates’
               court, and a complaint is the appropriate procedure for commencing civil proceedings in a
               magistrates’ court: see section 51 of the Magistrates ‘Courts Act 1980.
               -       Accordingly, I conclude that under domestic law an application for an anti-social
               behaviour order is not a criminal proceeding but is a civil proceeding.
               The European Convention on Human Rights
               -       Article 6(1) provides: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
               any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing. Article 6(3)
               provides: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights . . .
               (d) to examine . . . witnesses against him . . .” The defendants submitted that under the
               jurisprudence of the Convention an application for an anti-social behaviour order is a
               criminal charge, and accordingly the defendants will not have a fair hearing under article 6 if
               the evidence against them of anti-social behaviour is hearsay evidence and they do not have
               the opportunity to cross-examine in court the persons who have made allegations of such
               behaviour against them. In these submissions the defendants were supported by the
               submissions advanced by counsel on behalf of Liberty which was given leave to intervene in
               these appeals.
               room in deciding whether there is a criminal charge for the purposes of article 6 the
               European Court of Human Rights stated in Engel v The Netherlands (No 1) r EHRR 647,
               678, para 82. that it has regard to three criteria, which are the classification of the proceedings
               in domestic law, the nature of the offence, and the severity of the penalty which may be
               imposed. Whilst I am satisfied that the application for an anti-social behaviour order is a civil
               proceeding in domestic law the European Court has stated that the classification of the
               proceedings in domestic law is of limited value and that the other two criteria are
               considerations of greater weight: see Oztiirk v Germany 6 EHRR 409, 422, para 52.
               PART 5 © SWEET & MAXWELL
               47,
               Simon Cordell’s Skeleton Argument (2) Pdf
               Page: 296
               R (McCann) v Manchester Crown Ct (HL(E)
               Lord Hutton
               rot in relation to the second and third criteria the European Court stated in Qztiirk, at pp 423-
               414, para 53:
               “according to the ordinary meaning of the terms, there generally come within the ambit of the
               criminal law offences that make their perpetrator liable to penalties intended, inter alia, to be
               deterrent and usually consisting of fines and of measures depriving the person of his liberty . .
               . the general character of the rule [of law infringed by the applicant] and the purpose of the
               penalty, being both deterrent and punitive, suffice to show that the offence in question was, in
               terms of article 6 of the Convention, criminal in nature.”
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