Page 304 - 6. 2016 Diary 1st half New 26-05-21 No Table

An order had effect for the period specified, not less than two years, or until further order. In
lonergan v Lewes Crown Court [2005] EWHC 457 (Admin), it was said that just because an
order must run for a minimum of two years, it did not follow that each prohibition must
endure for the life of the order.
H8 The essential requirement of the section was that an order could be made only if it was
necessary to protect persons in any place in England and Wales from further anti-social acts
by the offender. The lest for making an order prohibiting the offender from doing something
was necessity. Each separate order prohibiting a person from doing a specified thing must be
necessary to protect persons from further anti-social acts by him. Any order should be tailor-
made for the individual offender, not designed on a word processor for use in every case. The
court must ask itself when considering any specific order prohibiting the offender from doing
something, “is this order necessary to protect persons in any place in England and Wales
from further anti-social acts by him?” The purpose of an order was not to punish an offender.
This followed from the requirement that the order must be necessary to protect persons from
further anti-social acts by him. The Court had been told that the imposition of an order was
sometimes sought by the defendant’s advocate at the sentencing stage, in the hope that the
court might make an order as an alternative to a custodial sentence. A court must not allow
itself to be diverted in this way—it might be better to decide the appropriate sentence and
then move on to consider whether an order should be made or not after the sentence had been
passed, albeit at the same hearing.
PART 5 © SWEET & MAXWELL
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Simon Cordell’s Skeleton Argument (2) Pdf
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R. v DEAN BONES AND OTHERS
H9 It followed from the requirement that the order must be necessary to protect persons from
further anti-social acts by the offender, that the court should not impose an order which
prohibited an offender from committing a specified criminal offence if the sentence which
could be passed following a conviction for the offence should be a sufficient deterrent. If
following a conviction for the offence, the offender would be liable to imprisonment, then the
order would add nothing other than to increase the sentence, if the sentence for the offence
was less than five years’ imprisonment. If the offender was not deterred from compelling the
offence by a sentence of imprisonment for the offence, the order was not likely further to
deter and therefore was not necessary. It had been said in that the Court was not persuaded
that the inclusion of matters among the prohibitions which were criminal offences was to be
actively discouraged. The Court in that case took the view that there was no harm in
reminding offenders that certain matters did constitute criminal conduct. The Court would
only comment that the test for making an order was not whether the offender needed
reminding that certain matters did constitute criminal conduct, but whether the order was
necessary.
H10 It had been held, rightly in the Court’s view, that an order should not be used merely to
increase the sentence of imprisonment which an offender was liable to receive. In Kirby
[2006] 1 Cr. App. R. f S.) 26 (p. 151) an order had been made prohibiting the offender from
driving, attempting to drive or allowing himself to be carried in any motor vehicle which
been taken without the consent of the owner, and driving or attempting to drive a motor
vehicle until the expiration of the appellant’s period of disqualification. The judge’s purpose
in making the order was to secure the result that if the appellant committed such offence
again the court would not be limited to the maximum penalty for the offences themselves but
would be able to impose up to five years’ imprisonment for breaches of the anti-social
behaviour order. The Court in Kirby considered that this was not a way in which the power