Page 320 - 6. 2016 Diary 1st half New 26-05-21 No Table

“that the necessity for such a prohibition is not supported by the material pull forward in
support of the application. There is very Little in the appellant’s antecedent history which
indicates a disposition to use a weapon. Furthermore, it is submitted that the wording of the
prohibition is obviously too wide, resulting in lack of clarity and consequences which are not
commensurate with the risk. Many otherwise innocent items have the capacity to be used as
weapons, including anything hard or with an edge or point. This prohibition has draconian
consequences. The appellant would be prohibited from doing a huge range of things
including having a drink in a public bar.”
- We have already noted judicial criticism of the use of the word “tool” (see para.[42]
above).
- The sixth order prohibited the appellant from:
Remaining on any shop, commercial or hospital premises if asked to leave by staff. Entering
any premises from which barred.
- The respondent submits:
“The appellant has convictions for offences of dishonesty, including an attempted burglary of
shop premises and he has been reprimanded for shoplifting. Thus, there appears to be a
foundation for such a prohibition. It is submitted that this term is capable of being understood
by the appellant and is proportionate given that it hinges upon being refused permission to
enter/ remain on particular premises by those who have control of them.”
- We agree, although we wonder whether the appellant would understand the staccato
sentence: “Entering any premises from which barred.”
PART 5 © SWEET & MAXWELL
.75,
Simon Cordell’s Skeleton Argument (2) Pdf
Page: 320
R. v DEAN BONES AND OTHERS
- The seventh order prohibited the appellant from:
Entering upon any private land adjoining any dwelling premises or commercial premises
outside of opening hours of that premises without the express permission of a person in
charge of that premises. This includes front gardens, driveways and paths. Except in the
course of lawful employment.
- The respondent points out that in McGrath the Court of Appeal held that a term
which prohibited the appellant from “trespassing on any land belonging to any person
whether legal or natural within those counties” was too wide and harsh. If the appellant looks
a wrong turn on a walk and entered someone’s property, he would be at risk of a five-year
prison sentence. In our view this prohibition, albeit less open to criticism than the one in
McGrath is also loo wide and harsh. Although certain pieces of land might easily be
identified as being caught by the prohibition (such as a front garden, driveway, or path) it
might be harder to recognise, say, in more rural areas. The absence of any geographical
restriction reinforces our view. Furthermore, there is no practical way that compliance with
the order could be enforced, at least outside the appellant’s immediate home area (see
para.[47] above).
- The eighth order prohibited the appellant, from:
Touching or entering any unattended vehicle without the express permission of the owner.
- The respondent submits:
“The appellant has previous convictions for aggravated vehicle taking and interfering with a
motor vehicle and has been reprimanded for theft of a motorcycle. It is submitted that the
prohibition is sufficiently clear and precise and is commensurate with the risk it seeks to
meet.”